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Abstract  
 
Land related investment decisions are shaped by both the formal and informal institutions governing land 
tenure and acquisition.  In the case of agricultural Kikuyu households in Kenya, we show that the 
inheritance practice of uncertain allocation in conjunction with the principle of equal division among heirs 
reduces long-term investments in land among potential heirs.  This apparent inefficiency is explained by 
intergenerational power dynamics within the household, as the inheritance practice allows parents to shift 
the investment incentives facing heirs in their favor.  This analytical framework is also used to illustrate 
that despite legislation formalizing women’s rights to property, control over land continues to follow the 
informal traditional patrilineal system in important ways.   
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I. Introduction and Context 
 
Ia. Introduction 
The notion that institutions matter is no longer controversial in the development 
literature.  The economic importance of the property rights system, the legal 
environment, and other “rules of the game” that shape the structure of incentives facing 
decision-makers has been convincingly and extensively argued both theoretically (e.g. 
North 1990) and empirically (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1995, Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001).  The process of institutional change, however, has proven a more 
elusive concept.  Theories such as Williamson’s (1985) New Institutional Economics 
emphasize a process driven by efficiency considerations: exogenously changing 
circumstances such as technology or population growth create incentives for actors to 
adopt new institutional arrangements that lower their transaction costs, and institutions 
evolve according to this imperative.  Where the interests of the affected actors are not in 
harmony, however, the story becomes less clear.  Institutional changes may impose costs 
on vested interests that benefit from the existing arrangements, creating the incentives for 
those interests to resist institutional changes that might reduce transaction costs for 
others.  In such cases, the question of whose incentives matter for institutional change 
becomes an important consideration.  This paper considers one such scenario- the 
resilience of informal land inheritance practices in the face of formal alternatives in 
Kenya.  We find that in this case, vested interests are effectively able to stave off 
institutional change at the expense of broader efficiency gains.   
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An institution of particular importance in agricultural societies is that of property 
rights over land.  For agricultural producers in developing countries, secure access to land 
is of fundamental importance to livelihoods.  Throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa 
and the rest of the developing world, the land tenure systems that define rights and 
determine their allocation are an amalgamation of formal and informal practices.  Rural 
communities typically have customary systems of managing land resources based on 
informal institutions and enforced by traditional means of authority.   Meanwhile, 
property rights are also conferred by the state and enforced by the formal legal system.  
To the extent that both the state and the traditional order maintain some degree of 
legitimacy and enforcement capability, both may retain de facto authority to define and 
assign land rights and adjudicate related disputes in different circumstances.   
In some contexts, formal and informal systems coexist in complementary or 
mutually reinforcing ways- for example, in a number of sub-Saharan African countries 
legislation explicitly recognizes the authority of local chiefs over certain aspects of land 
allocation, subject to the oversight of state institutions.1  In other cases, however, the 
formal and informal systems come into conflict.  Policymakers may seek to override the 
traditional system for a variety of reasons.  For example, they may wish to assert the 
predominance of state authority over traditional power structures.  Traditional property 
rights systems are sometimes perceived as insufficiently secure and thus a source of 
productive inefficiency (e.g. Golan 1993).  Alternatively, the motivation may be to 
redress inequities of the informal system by shifting the institutional structure in favor of 
groups that are disadvantaged under the traditional institutional arrangements.    To the 
                                                 
1 E.g.,, Namibia’s Communal Land Reform Act of 2001 recognizes the decisions of traditional chiefs with 
respect to agricultural and residence land within their jurisdictions. 
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extent that the state lacks perfect enforcement capability, however, formal legislation 
may be unable to displace customary institutions to varying degrees (de Soto 2000).   
 Inheritance processes are one arena in which tensions between formal and 
informal systems may play out.  Traditional communities have established rules 
governing the evolution of land tenure across generations, while the state provides an 
alternative legal basis for inheritance that may or may not be consistent.  As inheritance 
remains an important means by which land can be acquired in a variety of contexts, the 
prevailing system can have important implications for who can access land and how.   
One aspect of particular concern in this regard is the role of women in the 
inheritance process. Gender equity in terms of access to land is increasingly held as an 
important issue in the broader context of concern over gender inequality in developing 
countries (World Bank 2007), and legislation often reflects this priority (UNECA 2004).  
Frequently, however, traditional land tenure systems do not confer equal rights to women 
and men (Deininger 2003).  Gender issues are thus an instance where policy goals may 
conflict with outcomes under the informal institutional setup.  
This paper makes use of an unusual tradition among the Kikuyu in rural Kenya to 
consider the process of inheritance and the implications for women’s access to land in the 
context of contradictions between the formal and informal systems in rural Kenya.  The 
traditional Kikuyu system restricts the making of wills in such a way that introduces 
ambiguity and increases instances of intestacy. Under the formal system, these 
restrictions are eliminated.  We will show that despite the apparent efficiency gains under 
the formal system, the informal system persists, and we argue that this persistence can be 
explained by conflicting interests across generations.  In addition, we will look at the 
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extent to which legislation has been able to reverse the exclusion of women in land 
inheritance under the traditional system, both in terms of daughters’ inheritance, and the 
land rights of widows.   
 
Ib. Women’s Access to Land and Inheritance  
In many cases, women in sub-Saharan Africa face significant difficulties with 
respect to access to land and security of property rights.  Though recent reforms are 
encouraging, the legal basis for women to control land and operate as independent 
economic actors is not well established and in some case non-existent.  Marital property 
is typically held by the husband rather than jointly, and women face particular 
disadvantages under traditional systems (Joireman 2008).  Where women do control land, 
their rights are often insecure- in Uganda, Deininger and Castagnini (2006) find plots 
farmed by female-headed households are more likely to be under conflict as a result of 
competing claims.  These issues are of concern both from an equity perspective, and also 
because greater control of resources  for women has been observed to lead to increased 
spending related to the welfare of children within the household (e.g. Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing 2002). 
Unequal access to land extends to inheritance practices as well.  Under customary 
systems, sons are typically privileged over daughters in the inheritance process.  Widows’ 
rights to their husbands’ land are often limited, insecure, or non-existent (Joireman 2008).  
As inheritance remains an important means by which rural Africans access land in the 
context of limited land and credit markets, disadvantages faced by women in process 
have important implications.  
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The evolution of gender aspects of inheritance practices have been studied in 
other parts of the world.  Agarwal (1998) analyzes legal reforms in India that expand the 
rights of daughters and widows in the inheritance process.  As we fin here, she finds that 
legal guarantees have not been sufficient to effectively provide rights in practice.   
Conversely, in a survey of Latin American countries, Deere and Leon (2003) note a trend 
towards increasing equality in terms of inheritance, particularly where levels of literacy 
and education are increasing and the importance of agriculture is decreasing.  In the 
context of a traditionally matrilineal inheritance system in the Philippines, Quisumbing 
and Otsuka (2001) show that inheritance patterns have evolved significantly towards a 
more gender balanced system.  In particular, they find that inheritance has shifted so that 
sons and daughters inherit different types of land in accordance with the intensity of its 
labor requirements (e.g., sons tend to inherit lands that requires clearing).  Hence, 
inheritance practices can be said to have evolved towards greater efficiency in this case.  
The implication of these papers is that there is scope for inheritance practices to evolve 
significantly over time. However, attempts to effect change through formalization have 
shown mixed results.      
 
Ic. Kikuyu Agriculture and Organization of the Household  
The Kikuyu are Kenya’s largest ethnic group, and predominate in the fertile 
central highlands of the country.  Agriculture is widespread.  A detailed discussion of 
cropping patterns is provided with our summary statistics in section III, but we note here 
that the most important crops for Kikuyu agricultural households tend to be maize and 
beans, as well as a variety of tree crops- it is estimated that 20% of high potential 
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agricultural land nationwide has either been planted with tree crops or left under woody 
cover.  Tree crops include coffee, tea, various fruit trees, as well as trees planted for 
timber, fodder, or soil conservation. Trees are relatively labor extensive, and thus may be 
favored by households facing labor shortages.  Trees may also be planted to reinforce 
informal property rights. (Dewees 1995)  Recent evidence suggests that smallholder 
timber production has become increasingly common as a cash crop.  (Carsan 2007) 
Relative to other crops, trees crops require a long waiting period before their 
returns can be reaped- coffee and tea trees typically require three to five years before they 
yield, while fruit trees often require longer.  Common timber species such as grevillia 
robusta often serve multiple uses- for example, they may be used as shade trees or to 
demarcate boundaries, while at the same time being pruned for timber. (Harwood 1998)   
Hence, the decision to plant tree crops may be influenced by the value of the returns, or 
time preferences, as those who discount the future to a lesser extent will be more inclined 
to plant trees.  Concerns over tenure security may also play a role, both planting tree 
crops can strengthen informal claims, and conversely because weaker tenure security 
implies a greater risk that the returns may not be realized.    
Traditionally, organization of agricultural Kikuyu households follows strict 
gender and generational divisions of labor.  The male household head is responsible for 
livestock production and the building and maintenance of structures on the property, and 
has control over all productive resources.  Agriculture and food preparation are the 
responsibility of wives2, along with their children- a woman and her children are 
essentially a separate, self-sufficient unit.  Fathers contribute to their children’s education 
                                                 
2 Traditionally, Kikuyu households are polygamous, but this practice has become increasingly rare over 
time. 
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and health care, while utilizing some of their sons’ labor for livestock and building-
related activities. (Price 1996) 
 
Id. Kikuyu Inheritance Practices 
Traditional Kikuyu inheritance practices are rooted in traditional forms of land 
tenure.  Prior to colonization, the sub-clan was the unit of authority governing land rights, 
and though the state is now the ultimate authority the sub-clan remains significant.  Sub-
clan elders are typically the first option in terms of handling boundary or livestock-
related land disputes between neighbors, may restrict transactions on certain areas that 
constitute ancestral lands, and oversee inheritance as well. Rights to plant and harvest 
trees are vested in the household head, so that with the exception of certain redeemable 
sale agreements, trees are owned by the landholder. (Dewees 1995)  This is in contrast to 
some other parts of Africa, where tree tenure and land tenure are distinct. 
The Kikuyu kinship system is patrilineal, so that an individual’s sub-clan 
affiliation is determined by their father’s or husband’s affiliation.  In order to maintain 
the territorial integrity of the sub-clan, land was traditionally bequeathed only to males 
(as land inherited by women would eventually pass to their heirs, who would be 
considered members of other sub-clans).  Social norms dictate that land and other 
productive assets are allocated in equal shares to each son, and these norms were codified 
into law in the 1963 Registered Land Act (Mackenzie 1989).  Equal division among male 
heirs remains the guiding principal in terms of the division of land assets at inheritance. 
(Kameri-Mbote 1995, Price 1996)  The sub-clan maintains significant control over the 
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inheritance process, as for each estate one of the sub-clan elders performs the function of 
muramati, similar to executorship. 
A key feature of traditional Kikuyu inheritance practices for the purposes of the 
analysis in this paper is that they impose significant restrictions on the circumstances 
under which wills can be made.  Wills must be transmitted orally to the muramati.  They 
can only be given when the testator’s death appears imminent; i.e., when the testator is 
severely ill or injured, or has reached an advanced age.  Written wills are prohibited, and 
the will cannot be communicated to the muramati in advance. In allocating the estate 
between the heirs, the muramati is compelled to adhere to the principle of equal division 
among heirs, and to consider the father’s wishes to the greatest extent possible.  Because 
of the fact that these wishes cannot be communicated in advance, however, it is common 
for household heads to die intestate. (Kameri-Mbote 1995)  Moreover, the fact that wills 
are usually given under extreme duress further limits the precision with which the father 
can communicate wishes concerning the division of his estate to the muramati. 
From the perspective on an heir who is awaiting inheritance, these restrictions 
introduce an element of uncertainty.  As discussed, each heir knows that he will inherit an 
equal share of the estate.  However, the heir cannot be certain what form this share will 
take in advance.  In the case where land is the principal household asset, the implication 
is that heirs do not know what parcel they will inherit in advance.  This ambiguity has not 
been observed in other Kenyan tribes.  Shipton (1984), for example, notes the opposite 
tendency among the Luo (p.125)- allocation of land between heirs is generally made 
explicit prior to the father’s death. 
 
10 
 
Ie. Inheritance and Womens’ Access to Land in Kenya 
Traditionally, Kikuyu women do not take part in any aspect of inheritance, as 
their rights over land are limited and conditional.  A woman’s right to land is vested in 
her father, husband, or sons.  In the event that the male relative dies or migrates, the 
rights of the woman are extinguished.  Widows may become the de facto household 
heads in terms of informal decision making authority, but often title over estate land 
passes directly to the sons upon the father’s death (Price 1996).  Sons are generally 
expected to care for their widowed mothers, but a widow’s access to land is entirely at 
her sons’ discretion.  There is some heterogeneity across tribes, but in general women 
occupy a similarly weak position in traditional systems of land tenure and inheritance in 
Kenya (e.g. Henrysson and Joireman 2008). 
The process of inheritance and the rights of women under Kenyan law contrast 
sharply with traditional practices in important ways.  The principal piece of legislation 
concerning inheritance is the Law of Succession Act of 1981, which contains provisions 
for both testate and intestate succession.  All Kenyan citizens are accorded the right to 
make either oral or written wills at any time.  The process is simple and does not impose 
undue costs or difficulties: a will is valid if it is signed by the testator and two witnesses 
who will affirm the testator’s signature.  Section 5(2) of the Act makes specific reference 
to the rights of women to make wills: “A female person, whether married or unmarried, 
has the same capacity to make a Will as a male person.”  
In cases of intestate succession, the Act provides significant protections for 
widows and daughters in its elaboration of the priority that the court should give to 
various successors.  The Act gives preference to the surviving spouse as the beneficiary 
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and executor, whether male or female.  Women maintain a life interest in their deceased 
husband’s property; this interest is transferable to heirs.  In acknowledgement of 
traditional kinship systems, however, the interest terminates in the event that the widow 
remarries.  Daughters and granddaughters receive the same priority and rights as sons and 
grandsons. (Kameri-Mbote 1995) 
The Law of Succession Act grants a broader scope of rights to testators and 
women than the Kikuyu traditional system provides.  As such, the formal and informal 
systems come into conflict with one another.  The  remainder of this paper will examine 
the extent to which the Law of Succession Act has been able to displace traditional 
restrictions on the making of wills and on the land rights of women.      
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
IIa.. The Model 
In this section, we develop a theoretical model of intergenerational investment 
behavior within an agricultural household.  The household consists of a Parent and N 
identical heirs, designated H1 through HN.  The infinitely lived heirs’ lifetime utility 
takes an additively separable form, and is described by the utility function: 
1
( )tHi t
t
U W cδ∞
=
=∑  (2.1) 
With U twice differentiable and increasing in all of its arguments. 
Each heir is matched with an identical parcel ai in period 1; there are N such plots 
in the household’s land endowment.  Heirs are endowed with L units of labor in each 
period.  They allocate this labor between two separate investment activities I and T, 
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which can be thought of as planting maize and planting tree crops respectively3.  
Investment in I in a given period generates R(I) units of the consumption good c in that 
period, while investment in T generates S(T) units of c on the plot on which it was 
invested in the following period.   
As long as the Parent is alive, he appropriates a share of the consumption good 
from each Heir in each period.  This “tax” is an exogenous, socially determined 
proportion of each Heir’s output given by 1-α, so that each Heir keeps the proportion α of 
the consumption good that he produces in each period during the Parent’s lifetime.  The 
Parent’s lifespan is finite and described by the hazard function h(t), which gives the 
probability that the Parent dies in period t given that he is survived to period t-1. 
Upon the death of the Parent, the household’s land is inherited by the Heirs.  As 
discussed in the previous section, inheritance takes place according to the principle of 
equal division among heirs, but there is some uncertainty in terms of the particular parcel 
that each heir inherits.  This uncertainty is represented by the bequest rule, which we 
define as follows: under bequest rule p, all Heirs inherit the parcels they were initially 
allocated with probability p.  With probability 1 – p, the plots are randomly allocated 
across the Heirs.  Thus, the probability that an Heir will inherit the plot he was initially 
allocated is 1 pp
N
−+ .  The parameter p is exogenous and static, and is known to the 
Heirs in advance. 
                                                 
3 As discussed in the previous section, while the father may have ultimate decision-making authority within 
the household, his involvement in agriculture is limited.  Thus, adult sons and daughter can be presumed to 
have some measure of discretion over how they allocate their labor.  In reality, some of the heirs’ labor 
power is liable to be subject to the parents’ authority, hence our model can be thought of as reflecting some 
quantity of residual labor that the heirs can allocate as they choose. 
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Each period t prior to the Parent’s death consists of the sequence of events 
described in Figure 1.  At the start of period t, the Heirs observe whether or not the Parent 
survives until the next period.  If the Parent survives period t, the next step is for the 
Heirs to make their investment decisions, allocating their L units of labor across the 
activities I and T.  Each Heir then realizes both his instantaneous return to I, and the 
return to his period t-1 investment in T.  This return is given by the technologies R and S 
in the form of the consumption good c.  The Parent appropriates his share, and the Heirs 
consume the entirety of their allocations of c.  
 [FIGURE 1] 
Alternatively, with probability h(t) the Parent will die in period t; the Heirs will 
observe this at the start of the period.  In this case, the next step is that inheritance takes 
place as per the bequest rule p.  The Heirs then make their investment decisions.  As in 
the previous case, each realizes the instantaneous returns to his period t investment in I.  
However, the fact that inheritance has taken place implies two differences pertaining to 
the investment yields.  First, Heirs may or may not realize the returns to their own period 
t-1 investments in T.  If an Heir does not inherit the plot that he was initially allocated, he 
reaps the return of the previous occupant’s investment rather than his own; recall that this 
will occur with probability 11 pp
N
−⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  Secondly, there is no tax imposed by the 
Parent, so each Heir consumes the entirety of the quantity of c that was produced by the 
investments in I and T on his parcel. 
The anticipation of inheritance thus alters the incentives facing the Heirs to invest 
in T in any period t prior to the Parent’s death in two contrasting ways.  First, there is a 
possibility that the returns to an Heir’s investment in T will be shielded from Parental 
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expropriation, unlike the investment in I which is subject to the Parent’s tax α with 
certainty.  In the event that Parent dies in period t+1 and the Heir retains his parcel in the 
inheritance process, the yield from his investment in T in period t will not be subject to α 
and he will consumer the entirety of the returns himself.  This occurs with 
probability 1( 1) ph t p
N
−⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  We term the increase in the Heir’s expected return to T 
resulting from this possibility the “tax shelter incentive.”    
Conversely, uncertainty associated with inheritance implies a risk-induced 
disincentive to investing in T.  With probability 1( 1) 1 ph t p
N
⎛ − ⎞⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ , the Parent will 
die in the next period but the Heir’s parcel we be reallocated to one of the other heirs.  
This risk that the Heir’s investment in T will be lost entirely is termed the “reallocation 
risk disincentive.”   This is in effect the result of a coordination problem- each Heir’s 
investment in T generates a positive externality resulting from the possibility that the 
returns will go to another Heir.  However, the incentive for each Heir is to consider only 
his own private returns.4   
In order to greatly simplify the analysis, we make three further assumptions.  
First, we assume that there are no land, labor, or credit markets.  Each Heir allocates his 
entire labor endowment in each period to production on the plot he has been allocated.  
Second, we assume that Heirs are risk neutral.  The analysis does not hinge on these 
assumption; the key findings hold across a range of assumptions about market conditions 
and risk preferences.  Finally, we make a necessary assumption that the technologies R 
                                                 
4 If Heirs were able to enter into enforceable agreements with one another, there would be no coordination 
problem and the disincentive to invest in T would disappear.  As we will see, however, such an agreement 
amounts to collusion against the interests of the Parent, so it is reasonable to assume that this behavior is 
socially prohibited.   
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and S are convex, and that this convexity is of sufficient magnitude to guarantee an 
interior solution. 
 
IIb. The Heir’s Problem 
Throughout this section, we consider the behavior of a “representative Heir,” 
since each Heir is identical.  Note that each Heir behaving as the representative Heir is a 
Nash Equilibrium; no Heir can improve on his outcome by behaving differently from the 
other Heirs.   
Over any two-period horizon, the Heir maximizes his expected utility as follows: 
 (2.2) 
 
In light of our assumption of risk neutrality, we can write this as: 
 (2.3) 
 
The constraints on the Heir’s problem change following inheritance, so we must 
differentiate between the pre-inheritance and post-inheritance regimes.  We suppose that 
the pre-inheritance regime lasts from period one until some period k, in which the Parent 
dies.   Of course, period k is not known in advance, but since Heirs observe the Parent’s 
hazard function h(t), they can evaluate the probability that the Parent will die at any 
particular time. 
In any given period t such that 1 t k≤ < , the constraints are:  
( )*1. ( ) ( ) ( )t t ti E c R I S Tα −= +   (2.4) 
1 1
1, , ,
max  E ( ) E ( )
t t t t
t tI I T T
W c W cδ
+ +
+⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
( ) ( )
1 1
1, , ,
max  ( ) ( )
t t t t
t tI I T T
W E c W E cδ
+ +
++
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[ ]1 1. ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )
1       ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
t t t
t t
ii E c h t h t R I h t S T
ph t p S T p S T
N
α α+ += − + + −
⎡ − ⎤⎛ ⎞+ + + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (2.5) 
. t tiii I T L+ =   (2.6) 
1 1. t tiv I T L+ ++ =  (2.7) 
Where T indicates the average investment made by the other Heirs and *1tT − is the 
Heir’s optimal choice of T in period t-1. 
Considering the Heir’s problem at time t, constraint i. illustrates that investment in 
I returns R(I) with certainty, and is subject to the Parent’s tax.  The return to investment 
in T, however, is uncertain.  If the Parent survives, the investment yields S(Tt-1), which is 
subject to the Parent tax; this is shown in the second term on the right hand side of 
constraint ii.    If the Parent does not survive, the Heir does not have the pay the Parent’s 
tax on c, but because of the inheritance process he may not reap any returns at all from 
his investment, as the next term reflects. 
The first order condition equates the marginal returns in terms of expected utility 
from the two types of investment: 
( ) 11 ( ) ( )
t t t t t
R W W S p Sh t h t p
I c c T N T
α δ α⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂⎡ ⎤= − + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦   (2.8) 
In order to see how the anticipation of inheritance affects investment decisions, 
we consider how the optimal investment choice varies with the hazard rate.  As the 
likelihood of the Parent’s death increases, the influence of inheritance considerations on 
the Heir’s investment decision is magnified.  We can thus identify how inheritance 
concerns affect investment decisions and how the parameters condition this relationship 
by looking at the evolution of the optimal investment choice over time.  From (2.8), we 
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see that the return to I is time invariant, which we expect since there is no uncertainty 
associated with investing in I.  In order to see how the optimal rate of tree planting 
changes with the Parent’s hazard rate, we differentiate the return to investing in Tt with 
respect to h(t) to obtain: 
( )
1
( ) t t
E U
p S ST p
h t N T T
α
∂⎛ ⎞∂ ⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞− ∂ ∂∂ ⎡ ⎤⎝ ⎠ = + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
  (2.9) 
We define the value of (2.9) to be HTΔ , which is greater than zero iff: 
1 pp
N
α−+ >   (2.10) 
The sign of HTΔ is ambiguous as (2.9) and (2.10) reflect the conflicting tax 
shelter and coordination problem incentives.  Tree planting will tend to increase over 
time if α is low- if the Parent appropriates a higher share of the Heirs’ output, the Heirs 
will find T more attractive as a tax shelter. Over time, the potential for the Heirs to 
experience the tax shelter benefits increases.  Similarly, if the probability 1 pp
N
−+ that an 
Heir will retain his parcel is low, then the reallocation risk disincentive is exacerbated.  If 
Heirs are unlikely to reap their returns privately, they will invest less in T as inheritance 
becomes imminent.  The direction in which Heirs adjust their tree planting depends on 
whether the tax shelter effect or the reallocation risk predominates. 
We note one special case in which the sign of HTΔ  is unambiguous. In the 
absence of uncertainty over which parcel each Heir will inherit, tree planting must be 
strictly increasing in the Parent’s hazard rate.  In this case, the reallocation risk is absent, 
so that only the tax shelter incentive is at work.  Such an absence of uncertainty would 
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result from a bequest rule specifying that p = 1; it is apparent from (2.10) that if p = 1, 
then HTΔ > 0. 
Following the death of the Parent in period k, the constraints on the Heir’s utility 
maximization problem are: 
1. ( ) ( )k i k i k ii c R I S T+ + + −= +  (2.11) 
. k i k iii I T L+ ++ =  (2.12) 
  The Heir no longer must surrender (1 )α− of his output to the Parent, and also 
faces no uncertainty associated with investing in T since inheritance has already occurred 
and there is no further risk that he will lose the parcel. The first order condition is simply: 
t i t i
R S
I T
δ
+ +
∂ ∂=∂ ∂   (2.13) 
Thus, following inheritance Heirs readjust their investment behavior.  There is no 
longer a distortionary effect due to the anticipation of inheritance, so Heirs are motivated 
solely by the discounted returns to the technologies. Eliminating the tax shelter effect 
leads to a reduction in tree planting in the case where HTΔ > 0, while if HTΔ < 0 the 
implication of inheritance is that the coordination problem no long exists, and tree 
planting will subsequently increase in response.   
These theoretical findings are illustrated in Figure 2.  The Heirs will alter their 
rate of tree planting according to condition (2.9) as the Parent’s hazard rate increases.  
Following the Parent’s death in period k, the Heir adjusts his investment decision in the 
opposite direction, as inheritance issues are no longer a concern. 
[FIGURE 2] 
IIc Gender Implications and Testable Hypotheses 
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We turn now to the implications of this analysis for the issues of daughters’ 
inheritance and widows’ control over land.  The relevance of the foregoing analysis to 
these issues stems from the fact that the model predicts behavior changes by heirs as they 
anticipate inheriting land.  As illustrated in Figure 2., as the parent ages the heirs in the 
household should respond by either increasing or decreasing their tree planting, 
depending on the parameters.  In our empirical investigation, we can thus consider the 
behavior of adult sons resident on the family farm as compared to adult daughters.  To 
the extent that inheritance is not differentiated on the basis of gender, we would expect to 
see tree-planting behavior evolve in the same way for both sons and daughters.  
We can also use this analysis to consider the extent to which the Law of 
Succession Act has been able to guarantee secure property rights for widows, as opposed 
to the traditional system in which land passes directly from fathers to sons.  If widows do 
in fact have secure tenure and the right to bequeath land, then the heirs’ tree planting 
should vary with the hazard rate of the last surviving parent, regardless of gender- if the 
father dies first, then heirs face the same incentive to adjust their investment behavior 
until the death of the mother.  Conversely, if land passes directly from the father to the 
heirs, then only the father’s age should induce a change tree planting.  In that case, we 
would not expect to see the behavior illustrated in Figure 2 in female-headed households. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
IIIa. Description of the Data and Modelling Approach 
The data used in this paper were collected in 2004 in a variety of locations 
throughout western and central Kenya.  The data collection effort was a collaboration 
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between the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), the Tegemeo 
Institute of Egerton University, the World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF), and 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).  The survey collected a wide array of 
information on agriculture (including tree planting), demographics, land holdings, and 
other household characteristics.  The number of agricultural households is 516; they 
occupy a total of 903 plots5.  Kikuyu are the predominant ethnic group in the sample, 
comprising just under half of the total, while the remainder are a mix of various other 
ethnic groups.  115 of the households are classified as female-headed for inheritance 
purposes.6     
We also use data from The World Health Organization to measure the Parent’s 
hazard function h(t).  The WHO provides estimates of yearly hazard rates by age for 
Kenyan men and women in 2004.  From these, we calculate the probability that a Kenyan 
man or woman of a particular age will die within the next five years in order to obtain a 
time horizon similar to that in which tree planting decisions take place.  The results are 
shown in Figure 3. 
[FIGURE 3] 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample, as well as for Kikuyu 
and non-Kikuyu households by gender of the household head.  Overall, the sample tends 
toward poor smallholders.  Mean annual household income is US$842, with an average 
household size of 7.5 members.  The average plot size is 1.94 acres, and 82% of the 
households farm either one or two plots.   The majority of plots were acquired by means 
                                                 
5 I drop non-agricultural plots, household and plot observations with data irregularities, and outliers in the 
form of large commercial plantations. 
6 A household is classified as female headed if a woman identifies herself as the head of the household and 
neither her husband nor her father are resident in the household, or if a male self-identified household 
head’s mother is resident in the household but his father is not. 
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of inheritance, and have typically been in the household’s possession for 21.1 years.  In 
most cases households hold formal title to their plots, and employ some quantity of hired 
labor to work the plot.  
[TABLE 1] 
As we would like to compare the heirs’ behavior across genders and ethnicities, it 
is useful consider the differences between the different household types in detail.  Thus, 
below the variable names in Table 1 we indicate where F-tests reject the hypothesis of 
equality of the means at 5%.  A statistically significant difference between the Kikuyu 
and non-Kikuyu samples is indicated by a *, while + and ++ indicate differences by 
gender within the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu samples respectively.   
The results indicate significant differences between the sub-samples in a number 
of cases.  Non-Kikuyu households tend to have more male heirs, as well as a 
correspondingly higher number of total adults in the household, and more children as 
well.  The samples are similar in terms of household income, and the age of the head, as 
well as mode of acquisition and length of tenure.  Some important differences in farm 
characteristics likely reflect differing agroecological conditions- non-Kikuyu households 
plant fewer trees overall, and are less likely to have sloped plots or hire labor.  They are 
significantly more likely to have markets in their villages, and less likely to have formal 
title over their land. 
In terms of gender differences, for both ethnicities female heads of household 
tend to be less educated.  Among the non-Kikuyu households, the only other significant 
difference is that female-headed households are overwhelmingly located in villages with 
markets.  More substantial differences exist in the Kikuyu sample- male-headed 
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households have slightly more adults and children in the household, though the difference 
in the number of adult potential heirs is not significantly different.  Additionally, female-
headed households tend to be somewhat older and to have had longer tenure.  The 
difference in age is not reflected in mortality risk, which is equal across Kikuyu 
households.  We return to discussion of what these differences might imply for our 
results in the next section.   
Tree stocks for producing households are shown in table 2.   Production of tea 
tends to take place on a large scale, with over 1,000 trees on average.  Households that 
grow coffee and timber also tend to maintain substantial stocks of trees as well, while 
production of fruit is on a smaller scale, with fruit producers averaging 18.5 trees.  
Looking at tree production across our sub-samples, we note some important differences.  
Coffee is more prevalent in Kikuyu areas, with 56% of Kikuyu plots producing coffee as 
compared to 34% of non-Kikuyu plots, while tea is nearly twice likely to be grown in 
non-Kikuyu areas.  Both coffee and tea are grown on a larger scale by Kikuyu, as the 
stocks are significantly larger for both crops.  This may be due to the fact that the Kikuyu 
households face more limited market access, creating economies of scale in 
transportation and marketing of cash crops.  Female-headed households plant fewer 
timber trees, but more for fodder and conservation. 
[TABLE 2] 
The empirical strategy is to test for whether the investment behavior of heirs 
changes in anticipation of inheritance in accordance with the predictions of the theoretical 
model and to compare the changes across ethnicity, gender of the potential heir, and 
gender of the household head.  Recall that non-Kikuyu households do not face 
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uncertainty with regard to inheritance, as the division of the estate is generally specified 
in advance.  In terms of the theoretical model in the previous section, this corresponds to 
a bequest of rule p = 1.  Non-Kikuyu face only the tax shelter incentive and not the 
reallocation risk coordination problem, as returns to trees are always reaped privately.  
The model thus yields the unambiguous prediction that HTΔ > 0 and non-Kikuyu heirs 
will increase tree planting as they anticipate inheritance.  For the Kikuyu, the uncertainty 
caused by the restrictions on will-making under the traditional system introduces the 
reallocation risk disincentive.  The sign of HTΔ is ambiguous and depends on the 
parameters, but we can predict that as a result of the coordination problem HTΔ  will be 
smaller in the Kikuyu case than in the non-Kikuyu case to the extent that the traditional 
restrictions on making wills persist.7   
Similarly, we can test hypotheses related to the extent to which the Law of 
Succession Act has been able to displace traditional inheritance practices that 
disadvantage women.  If adult daughters show the same investment response in 
anticipation of inheritance as their brothers do, the implication is that they are inheriting 
land as well.  Additionally, if female heads of households have the right to bequeath land, 
we would not expect the heirs’ behavior to differ between male and female-headed 
households. 
 
IIIb. Model and Estimation 
                                                 
7Assuming that  there is no systematic difference in α across ethnicities. 
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We divide the sample into Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu owned plots and undertake 
separate estimations for each subsample.  Our dependent variable is the square root of the 
density of trees on the plot.  The empirical model is thus: 
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 Where the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu subsamples are denoted by A and B 
respectively, Xij is a vector of plot specific characteristics, Yj is a vector of household 
specific characteristics, and Zij is a measure of behavior in anticipation of inheritance, 
while eij is the disturbance term. 
Our theoretical model shows that a household’s inheritance anticipation response 
at a given time depends on the parent’s hazard rate h(t), the number of heirs N, the 
bequest rule p, and the share α that the parent appropriates for his own consumption.  We 
do not observe p or α, hence we rely on h(t) and N.  The density of trees should be 
decreasing in N provided p < 1 because of the heirs’ coordination problem implied by the 
reallocation risk.  However, if there is no uncertainty associated with the bequest rule, 
then in the non-Kikuyu case there should be no relationship between N and the density of 
trees.  The theory also predicts a significant relationship between h(t) and tree density; 
the direction of this effect depends on p and α cannot be signed a priori.   
In order to look at the gender differences, we differentiate between male and 
female heirs.  In addition, we interact our inheritance anticipation measure with dummy 
variables corresponding to the gender of the household head, allowing the coefficients on 
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this measure to vary with gender of the household head.  Thus our vector of inheritance 
anticipation variables is as follows: 
1
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Where the subscript M or F indicates the number of male or female potential heirs 
respectively, d1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the household head is male, and d2 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the household head is female. 
Note that this specification implies two assumptions- first, our choice to 
disaggregate the sample and perform separate estimations implies that the coefficients on 
the control variables are not equal across ethnicities; otherwise we could estimate a single 
model and employ dummy variables to distinguish between the effects of ethnicity on the 
inheritance measures.  Conversely, the way we specify the inheritance measure implies 
that we can in fact estimate a single equation for both genders of household heads within 
the same ethnic group.  That is, for both ethnic groups, we impose the constraint that the 
coefficients on the control variables are equal for male and female household heads.  We 
explore the validity of these assumptions in the appendix. 
One important concern in terms of our selection of control variables is the 
relationship between tree planting decisions and labor availability.  As discussed, Dewees 
(2005) hypothesizes that tree crops in Kenya tend to require less labor than other crops, 
and as a result households may opt for tree crops to cope with labor shortages.  This 
presents a potential problem for our analysis, as the number of heirs in the household 
could be a proxy for labor availability.  To account for this possibility, we include a 
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dummy variable set equal to one if the household employs hired labor on the plot in 
question, and also control for both the total number of adults in the household, including 
heirs, parents, laborers, and other relatives, as well as the number of children.  
 
IIIc. Results 
The results are presented in Table 3.  The relationships between the control 
variables and tree density are intuitively plausible and largely conform to expectations.  
In both subsamples, tree density is positively associated with the number of years since 
the plot was acquired, and negatively associated with the size of the plot.  Kikuyu 
households with formal titles appear to feel more secure in making long term investments 
and thus plant more trees than those with informal tenure.  Kikuyu households are also 
more apt to plant trees on plots that are sloped, while inherited plots tend to have a higher 
tree density than those acquired by other means.  Among non-Kikuyu households, the 
education level of the household head is positively associated with tree planting. 
[TABLE 3] 
In terms of the labor constraint measures, for the non-Kikuyu households more 
adults in the household are associated with fewer trees.  This is consistent with the 
presence of a labor constraint.  Conversely, for the Kikuyu households with more adults 
plant more trees, though the significance of the coefficient is weak. All of the other 
measures of labor availability are insignificant.  It is also worth noting that hired labor is 
employed on 81% of the plots in the sample; the lack of significance of the coefficient on 
the associated variable shows that the availability of hired labor is not related to tree 
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density.  Overall, our results suggest that tree-planting decisions are not significantly 
affected by labor constraints. 
Finally, we look at the results concerning the effects of anticipation of inheritance.  
For both the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu subsamples, the coefficient for male heirs in male 
headed households is significant.  The estimate of the coefficient for the non-Kikuyu 
subsample is positive.  In the absence of uncertainty related to which plot they will 
inherit, non-Kikuyu heirs who anticipate inheriting land will tend to plant more trees in 
order to take advantage of the tax shelter incentive.  Meanwhile, the coefficient for the 
Kikuyu subsample is negative.  The implication is that the reallocation risk disincentive 
dominates the tax shelter incentive.  A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the 
Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu coefficients are equal at p < .01.  As our model predicts, the 
reallocation risk disincentive created by the traditional restriction on will-making plays a 
significant role in determining investment choices. 
The evidence of gender differentiation again differs between Kikuyu and non-
Kikuyu households.  For the Kikuyu households, the presence of female potential heirs in 
the household does not impact tree density.  The coefficients on the inheritance variables 
are also insignificant in female headed households.  Conversely, sons in non-Kikuyu 
female headed households exhibit similar behavior as in male headed households.  For 
non-Kikuyu female potential heirs, the coefficient is insignificant in male headed 
households, and weakly significant in female headed households.  It is important to note 
that though these results strongly suggest that in the Kikuyu case sons behave differently 
in male-headed as opposed to female-headed households, we cannot conclusively reject 
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the hypotheses of equality of the coefficients across genders because of the high standard 
errors on the insignificant coefficients. 
Overall, then, our results support the assertion that in the case of Kikuyu 
inheritance practices, formal legislation has been unable to displace informal practices.  
We find strong evidence that uncertainty associated with the restrictions on making wills 
influences investment behavior on the part of the Kikuyu heirs.  The findings in terms of 
gender are more suggestive than conclusive, but nonetheless are consistent.  Adult 
daughters do not seem to make decisions in terms of tree planting with inheritance in 
mind.  This may be because they do not inherit land, although there are other plausible 
explanations here: there may be a gender division of labor whereby daughters are not 
involved in tree planting, or daughters may simply have less discretionary power over 
their labor than sons.  More compellingly, the inheritance incentives we observe in male 
headed households do not appear to be at work in female-headed households.  The 
implication is that sons inherit land upon the death of their fathers, hence the aging of 
their mothers is immaterial to their investment decisions.   
Among the non-Kikuyu households, reforms related to gender reforms seem to 
have been more effective.  Heirs exhibit an inheritance response in female as well as male 
headed households, suggesting that bequest decisions are made by the last surviving 
parent, rather than exclusively the father.  Two potential explanations for this discrepancy 
relate to the fact that as noted, the Kikuyu sample is significantly more rural than the non-
Kikuyu sample.  Women living in less rural areas may have more knowledge about, or 
access to, the formal system.  Additionally, the Kikuyu areas are more likely to be on the 
traditional territory of the sub-clan.  Women’s control over land has been limited 
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historically at least in part to maintain the territorial integrity of the patrilineal sub-clan.  
The heirs of a widow or daughter who marries outside the sub-clan would then be 
members of that sub-clan, hence land they inherit would transfer to their sub-clan.  
Concerns over these traditional boundaries still persist in certain areas.  We cannot 
observe this effect directly, but because of the nature of our sample, it seems more likely 
that Kikuyu households would be found in areas where these issues arise than the more 
dispersed and less rural non-Kikuyu households. 
 The overall implication is that informal institutions generate important differences 
between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu experiences with inheritance.  For male heirs, the non-
Kikuyu arrangements are more advantageous.  The absence of uncertainty pertaining to 
will-making allows them to take advantage of the tax shelter incentive without concern 
for the countervailing reallocation risk.  Conversely, Kikuyu fathers benefit from absence 
of formal wills in that the resultant uncertainty shifts investment patterns in a matter that 
is more consistent with their time preferences than those of the heirs.  Our evidence 
suggests that daughters and widows tend to have stronger inheritance rights in the non-
Kikuyu setting, though these findings are not conclusive.  Why this might be the case is a 
topic for further research. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Our results in previous section confirm that the prohibition on will-making among 
the Kikuyu creates a disincentive for heirs to plant trees that alters their investment 
choices. Moreover, women’s control over land in the inheritance process remains limited. 
Despite the formal changes mandated by the Law of Succession Act, the informal system 
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persists.  In this section, we discuss some reasons why this might be the case, and 
consider the broader implications. 
From the standpoint of total output, the investment distortions induced by the 
reallocation risk are a source of productive inefficiency. By eliminating a source of 
inefficiency, then, the formal system would appear to Pareto dominate the informal 
system.  Introducing a stronger mechanism to precommit to wills reduces or eliminates 
the heirs’ coordination problem, improving the efficiency of their investment choices 
with no apparent welfare loss.  From this perspective, the persistence of the informal 
system would seem to be a result of failure to make the formal alternative available to 
willing users- perhaps information dissemination has not been sufficient, or there is some 
hidden cost associated with using the formal system.    
Consideration of the interests of the parent, however, suggests an alternative 
explanation.  Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that in the absence of 
uncertainty, i.e., when p = 1, heirs will plant more trees as they anticipate inheritance in 
order to shield their output from parental expropriation.  It can be shown that for even an 
altruistic parent, under a range of conditions there is some p < 1 (i.e., a non-zero 
reallocation risk) that produces an outcome that is preferable to the case where p = 1.  We 
omit the details here, but the intuition is straightforward.  Increasing p reduces the heirs’ 
incentive to invest in T.  This is efficiency enhancing in terms of total output, since it 
reduces the distortion that the tax shelter incentive introduces.  By reducing T in the 
period prior to the parent’s death, this also increases the parent’s relative share of total 
consumption, since the heirs now shied less of the consumption good than they do in the 
p = 1 case.  By effectively shortening the heirs’ time horizon, uncertainty associated with 
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inheritance induces the heirs to invest in such a way that more is produced during the 
parent’s lifetime. 
Hence, another explanation for the persistence of the informal system is that 
parents are able to effectively resist institutional change in order to defend their interests.  
As in Becker’s (1974) “rotten kid theorem,” the prevailing institutional set-up compels 
otherwise selfish heirs to act more in accordance with their parents’ interests.  Power 
dynamics within the household and the informal order allow the older to generation to 
maintain the status quo.   
A similar finding is reported by La Ferrara (2007).  She examines the case of 
inheritance rules in Ghana in the context of matrilineal descent rules whereby nephews 
inherit their uncles’ property.  She finds evidence that when this norm is strongly 
enforced, parents are able engage in strategic behavior by making or withholding inter 
vivos transfers to their migrant sons in exchange for transfers.  The interpretation is that a 
stronger norm makes the threat of disinheritance more credible, as the sons will have no 
claim to the family’s land after the father’s death.  Thus, the traditional norm of nephew 
inheritance may persist because it allows parents to shape the incentives facing their 
children to secure outcomes that they prefer. 
Institutions that compel heirs to behave in a way that suits their parents’ needs 
may also benefit parents in that they obviate the need for strategic behavior.  In the 
absence of such institutions, threats of disinheritance or favoritism may be the only way 
to compel the heirs to guarantee old age security.  Such behavior could create social 
tensions, and may also be psychically costly to parents.  From this standpoint, the kind of 
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inheritance institution described here can be thought of as a means of achieving outcomes 
that might otherwise require costly strategic behavior to generate.  
It is important to note also that despite the fact that inheritance institutions such as 
these may reduce productive efficiency, they may serve an important social function.  In 
an environment of rapid social change, informal institutions come under stress.  As 
urbanization continues and more and more of their children migrate, parents may find 
their traditional claims over resources weakened.  As such, inheritance institutions such 
as those described may play an important role in helping to ensure old age security.  In 
this sense, Kikuyu inheritance practices may be thought of less as powerful parents 
imposing their will, and more as an instance of the older generation utilizing its 
comparative advantage in the informal order as a survival strategy. 
This analysis also suggests that women’s control over and access to land in rural 
Kenya remains limited.  Again, legislation has not been sufficient to reverse traditional 
practices.  Daughters do not appear to inherit land, and male heirs anticipate inheritance 
prior to their father’s death only.  This issue is particularly pertinent in light of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, as access to land for AIDS widows is often a crucial aspect of 
survival strategies (Drimie 2003).  For policymakers, an understanding of the local 
institutional environment and attention to policy implementation are of crucial 
importance.    
Finally, this analysis highlights the importance of a broad conceptualization of 
institutional change.  As discussed, the New Institutional Economics tends to take a 
narrow focus on technology and resources as driving institutional change.  The story 
here, however, illustrates the importance of a complex interplay of factors.  Economic 
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development spurred by technological and institutional changes has led to increasing 
migration and a weakening of traditional means of old age security.  As a result, cultural 
factors become increasingly important in determining institutional change with respect to 
inheritance practices, as the older generation seeks to protect its interests.  While the NIE 
can provide useful insights, in some cases the process of institutional change is best 
understood as a more complex, contested process. 
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Appendix: Robustness checks and alternative modeling approaches 
To investigate the robustness of these findings, we undertake further empirical 
analysis in this section to address a number of potential concerns.  An important issue to 
bear in mind throughout the discussion is the relative importance of our findings from the 
previous section in terms of the overall analysis.  The key hypothesis of this paper is that 
Kikuyu heirs face uncertainty due to prohibitions on will-making, and as a result tend to 
under-invest in tree crops as their parents age.  Given that our results suggest that land 
passes directly from fathers to sons, the most important empirical result is that the 
coefficient on male heirs in male-headed Kikuyu households is negative and significant.  
The findings for the non-Kikuyu households are properly viewed as providing additional 
support for this key hypothesis, but they are not central to the main conclusions. 
One potential econometric concern is in the way that we have disaggregated the 
sample- recall that we estimate the model twice, once for each ethnicity, with dummy 
variables reflecting the gender of the household head.  Thus, we have assumed that the 
coefficients on control variables are equal across gender, but we allow the coefficients to 
differ across ethnicities.  The data justify this approach- a likelihood ratio test strongly 
rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on the control variables are equal across 
ethnicities, suggesting that it is appropriate to disaggregate the sample by ethnicity as we 
have done.  Meanwhile, within each of the two ethnic groups likelihood ratio tests fail to 
reject the hypotheses that the control variable coefficients differ on the basis of the 
gender of the household head.   
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As a check, however, in Table 4 we report results8 using specifications where we 
constrain all coefficients on the control variables to be equal across gender and ethnicity, 
as well as the case where we allow all coefficients to vary.  Our previous findings are not 
robust to the specification where we constrain the coefficients to equality- all coefficients 
lose significance, with the exception of an apparently anomalous case of Kikuyu female 
heirs in male headed households.  Conversely, when we estimate the model separately for 
each of the four subsamples, the results are consistent with our findings in terms of the 
male-headed households- the coefficients on the number of male heirs interacted with the 
households head’s age are significant and of the expected sign.  We do not obtain 
significant coefficients for the female headed households; in the non-Kikuyu case this is 
likely because the sample size is limited to 100 observations.  
[TABLE 4] 
The implication of the results in table 4 is that there are important differences 
between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu in terms of the factors that affect tree planting 
decisions.  Another potential objection is thus that the difference in the findings for the 
two sub-samples under the preferred specification could reflect some other structural 
difference, rather than inheritance anticipation behavior.  One possible source would be 
varying agroclimactic conditions, as was suggested by our summary statistics.  To partly 
account for this, we re-estimate the model using dummy variables for each of the 68 
villages.  The results appear in table 5.  For the Kikuyu subsample, male heirs in male-
headed households remains negative and significant at 5%, though we now obtain weakly 
significant results of the opposite sign for the coefficient on female heirs in female 
                                                 
8 For clarity, throughout this section we report the coefficients and p-values on our inheritance anticipation 
measures only.  In general, the coefficients on the control variables behave similarly to our preferred 
specification. 
36 
 
headed households.  Most of the coefficients in the non-Kikuyu lose significance, though 
they remain of the expected sign.  Thus, while our previous findings are somewhat 
muted, they are not contradicted by the inclusion of village-level controls. 
We cannot completely rule out the possibility that our results are driven by some 
unobservable structural difference.  However, this possibility seems unlikely- there is no 
apparent alternative theoretical or intuitive explanation as to why the presence of heirs 
interacted with the household head’s mortality risk would show a statistically significant 
effect on tree planting in opposite directions across the two sub-samples.    
Another potential concern relates to the fact that our variable of interest in the 
preferred specification is an interaction term.  Our measure of inheritance anticipation is 
the number of heirs interacted with the mortality risk and gender of the household head, 
and while we did include a gender dummy, we did not include the number of heirs or 
mortality risk as separate variables.  Hence, a potential concern is that the significance of 
the coefficients could be driven by one or the other variables, but not both.  In table 6, we 
estimate the model including these non-interacted variables separately and together with 
the interaction terms.  While our coefficients lose significance, the results for the Kikuyu 
subsample suggest that both mortality risk and the number of male heirs drives our 
previous findings- the signs are consistent, and both coefficients are significant in the 
final specification.  The results are less clear cut for the non-Kikuyu sample, but we do 
not see evidence that one of the two interaction terms predominates. 
[TABLE 6] 
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Under our preferred specification, our dependent variable was overall tree density, 
which we calculated by aggregating timber, fruit, coffee, tea, and fodder or conservation 
trees.  However, these tree crops have some important differences in terms of gestation 
period, value, and other characteristics.  It is thus of interest to estimate the model using 
the individual types of tree crops as our left-hand side variable.  These results are 
presented in tables 7 and 8.  Overall, they are consistent with our results under the 
preferred specification- of the twelve significant coefficients in these models, ten are of 
the expected sign, while both of the exceptions are with respect to fodder or conservation 
trees.  As fodder and conservation species are relatively uncommon, the findings suggest 
that aggregating the total number of trees is a valid approach. 
[TABLE 7] 
 [TABLE 8] 
Finally, our theoretical predictions in section II provide a second empirically 
testable hypothesis that we can investigate to potentially corroborate our findings.  Recall 
that the condition for tree-planting to be increasing the mortality risk of the household 
head was 1 pp
N
α−+ > , where p is the bequest rule, α is the proportion that the parent 
taxes, and N is the number of heirs.  Note that where N = 1, the left hand side is equal to 
one and thus tree planting will always increase.  This is because a single heir does not 
face uncertainty in terms of what plot he will inherit.  Thus, in anticipation of inheritance, 
his sole motivation is to shield his investments from his parent’s expropriation. 
Additionally, in households where no heirs are present, we should find no 
relationship between the household head’s mortality risk and tree-planting behavior.  We 
thus estimate a similar specification to model one but with an alternative inheritance 
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anticipation measure- we interact the household head’s mortality risk with dummy 
variables corresponding to zero, one, or multiple heirs.  As before, we allow the 
inheritance anticipation coefficients by gender, and estimate the model separately for the 
Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu samples.  Our expectation is that the coefficient should be 
positive in single heir case for both subsamples, positive and of greater magnitude in the 
non-Kikuyu sample for the multiple heir case, and negative for the multiple heir Kikuyu 
case.  For the zero heir cases, the coefficients should be insignificant. 
Table 9 shows the results of this estimation.  In the Kikuyu case, none of the 
coefficients are significant, and contrary to our predictions the coefficient on single heir 
male headed households is negative.  However, the fact that the multiple heir coefficient 
for male-headed households is negative, of greater magnitude, and nearly significant is 
encouraging.  The only coefficient in the non-Kikuyu case that is significant is in the 
single-heir case in female headed households.  Though the remaining coefficients are 
insignificant, all are of the expected sign.  Overall, these results neither lend support to, 
nor contradict, our previous findings.  The likely explanation for this ambiguity is that 
there are important differences between zero, single, and multiple heir households that we 
are not able to adequately control for.   As a result, we cannot obtain strong results from 
this model. 
 [TABLE 9] 
As a whole, our alterative specifications suggest that our findings with regard to 
the Kikuyu households are quite robust to range of alternative specifications.  In almost 
all cases, the coefficient on male heirs in male-headed households was negative and 
significant, while we did not obtain significant coefficients for female heirs or female 
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household heads.  Our assertion that sons plant fewer trees in anticipation of their father’s 
death is thus strongly supported. The results for the non-Kikuyu sample tended to be 
weaker.  While the coefficients remained of the expected sign and maintained reasonable 
standard errors, they tended to drop below conventional levels of significance.  One 
possibility here is that the fact that non-Kikuyu live in less remote areas results in non-
Kikuyu households having better access to credit and insurance markets, as well as non-
farm opportunities.  As a result, these relationships are weaker than what we find in the 
more market-constrained Kikuyu environment. 
The fact that these different specifications produce consistent results also argues 
against the possible alternative interpretation that the key findings are driven by 
something other than inheritance anticipation behavior.  In addition, the nature of our 
variable of interest also reduces the potential that the results are driven by some 
unobserved factor.  For that to be the case,  there would have to be some explanation that 
accounted for the fact that more heirs in conjunction with older household heads reduce 
tree planting in the Kikuyu case, but increase it in the non-Kikuyu case.  No such 
explanation suggests itself.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 All KIKUYU NON-KIKUYU 
  Male Headed Female Headed Male Headed Female Headed 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Per Capita 
Income, $US 842 2765 877 1498 666 673 925 4003 594 591 
No. of Female 
Heirs 0.78 1.03 0.80 0.98 0.71 0.87 0.79 1.12 0.75 0.96 
No. of Male 
Heirs 1.14 1.02 1.10 1.01 0.82 1.19 1.22 0.97 1.23 1.00 
Total Adults 4.85 2.33 4.50 1.93 3.96 2.57 5.24 2.35 5.32 2.80 
Children Under 
16 2.64 1.99 2.03 1.74 1.75 1.72 3.28 2.07 3.03 1.83 
HH Head Years 
of Education 6.53 4.82 7.62 4.27 2.79 3.68 7.74 4.63 2.17 3.67 
Age of HH 
Head 56.0 13.4 56.05 12.88 59.14 13.31 55.25 13.95 55.37 12.77 
5-Year 
Mortality Risk 
of HH Head 
0.26 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.26 0.19 0.29 0.25 
           
Size, Acres 1.94 2.23 2.04 2.53 1.90 2.00 1.91 2.12 1.78 1.85 
Years Since 
Acquisition 21.11 16.58 18.34 14.56 25.30 18.61 21.38 16.54 24.63 19.06 
Trees 213 375 285 432 227 353 172 337 142 319 
           
% Inherited 57.6%  56.4%  52.7%  58.3%  63.0%  
% Sloped 30.5%  42.7%  37.6%  20.6%  26.0%  
% Titled 67.4%  71.7%  73.1%  62.8%  68.0%  
% Labor Hired 80.8%  84.0%  87.1%  76.7%  82.0%  
% Market in 
Village 68.1%  43.0%  40.9%  86.4%  97.0%  
           
No. of plots 903  307  93  403  100  
No. of 
households 516  183  56  218  59  
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Table 2. Tree Planting by Household and Tree Type 
 
 Average no. of trees among planting households 
 All Kikuyu Non-Kikuyu Male Headed Female Headed 
Timber 130.6 102.6 149.1 139.0 98.0 
Fruit 18.5 21.2 16.5 18.6 17.9 
Coffee 309.7 373.2 227.5 307.2 319.5 
Tea 1407.9 2281.7 1031.2 1404.6 1423.5 
Fodder/ 
Conservation 
47.4 45.4 50.5 41.5 70.7 
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Table 3. Results 
 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  
 Kikuyu Non-Kikuyu 
Education of HH head 0.099 0.271 
 (-0.71) (1.96)*** 
HH used hired labor 0.011 0.127 
 (-0.03) (-0.43) 
Children under 15 in HH 0.423 -0.88 
 (-1.30) (2.77)* 
Total no. of adults in HH -1.364 0.392 
 (-0.90) (-0.28) 
Other trees on plots owned by HH 0.001 -0.001 
 (2.05)** (-1.16) 
Log of years since acquisition 2.279 2.347 
 (3.66)* (4.05)* 
Market in village 1.124 -3.279 
-1.02 (1.82)*** 
Plot size -0.8 -0.89 
 (3.36)* (3.14)* 
Plot sloped 2.954 2.821 
 (2.66)* (2.05)** 
Title deed 4.961 1.886 
 (3.35)* (-1.42) 
Plot inherited 5.356 1.723 
 (3.80)* (-1.24) 
Female-headed household dummy -2.64 -2.507 
 (-1.39) (-1.00) 
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of HH 
head, Male-headed HH 
-6.705 5.606 
(2.95)* (2.22)** 
Female Heirs X Mortality risk of HH 
head, Male-headed HH 
3.255 1.826 
(-1.09) (-0.72) 
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of HH 
head, Female-headed HH 
-0.514 9.528 
(-0.15) (2.01)** 
Female Heirs X Mortality risk of HH 
head, Female-headed HH 
-1.632 11.653 
(-0.28) (1.74)*** 
Constant -3.901 1.839 
 (-1.44) (-0.59) 
Observations 400 503 
Pseudo R-squared .047* .022* 
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Table 4. Alternative Aggregations of the Sub-Samples 
 All Kikuyu 
Male-Headed 
Households 
Non-Kikuyu 
Male-Headed 
Households 
Kikuyu 
Female-Headed 
Households 
Non-Kikuyu 
Female-Headed 
Households 
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of 
HH head, Male-headed Kikuyu HH 
 
-1.907     
(0.200)     
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Male-headed Kikuyu 
HH 
 
6.019     
(0.031)**     
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of 
HH head, Female-headed Kikuyu 
HH 
 
3.870     
(0.266)     
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Female-headed 
Kikuyu HH 
 
5.959     
(0.214)     
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of 
HH head, Male-headed non-Kikuyu 
HH 
 
0.981     
(0.687)     
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Male-headed non-
Kikuyu HH 
 
0.426     
(0.830)     
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of 
HH head, Female-headed non-
Kikuyu HH 
 
3.358     
(0.265)     
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Female-headed non-
Kikuyu HH 
 
8.321     
(0.273)     
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of 
HH head, Male-headed HH 
 
 -4.359 5.851   
 (0.004)* (0.040)**   
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Male-headed HH 
 
 3.622 2.221   
 (0.165) (0.238)   
Male Heirs X Mortality risk of 
HH head, Female-headed HH 
 
   -1.523 4.471 
   (0.324) (0.363) 
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Female-headed HH 
 
   -2.544 11.383 
   (0.485) (0.140) 
Pseudo log-likelihood -2884.15 -992.81 -1285.4 -272.5 -294.1 
Observations 903 307 403 93 100 
 
Robust p-values in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Specification of control variables as in Table 3, results omitted 
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Table 5. Specification with Village-Level Dummy Variables 
 Kikuyu Non-Kikuyu 
Male Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Male-headed HH 
 
-3.532 4.604 
(0.049)** (0.102) 
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Male-headed HH 
 
2.187 1.734 
(0.333) (0.331) 
Male Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Female-headed HH 
 
-2.550 4.096 
(0.100) (0.363) 
Female Heirs X Mortality risk 
of HH head, Female-headed HH 
 
5.032 10.330 
(0.079)*** (0.039)** 
Pseudo log-likelihood 
 
-1220.6 -1539.4 
Observations 
 
400 503 
Robust p-values in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Specification of control variables as in Table 3, results omitted 
  
47 
 
 
Table 6. Alternative Inheritance Anticipation Measures 
 Kikuyu Non-
Kikuyu 
Kikuyu Non-Kikuyu
Male head X mortality 
risk 
 
 
-4.839 5.029 -7.172 -6.795 
(0.110) (0.170) (0.057)*** (0.322) 
Female head X 
mortality risk 
 
0.015 10.017 5.832 -6.853 
(0.997) (0.035)** (0.292) (0.466) 
Female heirs X female 
head 
 
 
0.804 1.488 1.821 0.359 
(0.476) (0.312) (0.241) (0.830) 
Male heirs x male 
head 
 
 
-0.106 0.074 0.625 -3.004 
(0.892) (0.953) (0.617) (0.210) 
Female heirs X male 
head 
 
 
0.103 0.079 0.154 -0.319 
(0.900) (0.901) (0.907) (0.718) 
Male heirs X male 
head 
 
 
-1.876 -0.220 -2.353 -2.280 
(0.001)* (0.720) (0.000)* (0.089)***
Male Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Male-
headed HH 
 
  2.615 11.489 
  (0.123) (0.043)** 
Female Heirs X 
Mortality risk of HH 
head, Male-headed HH 
 
  -0.355 2.444 
  (0.929) (0.321) 
Male Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, 
Female-headed HH 
 
  -3.102 15.430 
  (0.259) (0.090)***
Female Heirs X 
Mortality risk of HH 
head, Female-headed HH 
 
  -6.366 12.161 
  (0.323) (0.225) 
Pseudo log-likelihood -1275.2 -1587.2 -1274.6 -1583.2 
Observations 400 503 400 503 
Robust p-values in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Specification of control variables as in Table 3, results omitted 
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Table 7. Differentiated Tree Crops, Kikuyu Households 
 
 Timber Fruit Coffee Tea Fodder 
Male Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Male-
headed HH 
 
-3.523 0.385 -3.768 -31.823 -1.880 
(0.106) (0.417) (0.079)*** (0.089)*** (0.015)** 
Female Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Male-
headed HH 
 
-2.697 0.442 2.282 16.861 1.247 
(0.411) (0.506) (0.605) (0.425) (0.357) 
Male Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Female-
headed HH 
 
-1.722 -0.376 2.130 -142.437 2.349 
(0.522) (0.361) (0.479) (0.052)*** (0.024)** 
Female Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Female-
headed HH 
 
2.336 0.394 -7.752 39.623 -0.699 
(0.489) (0.710) (0.418) (0.107) (0.797) 
Pseudo log-likelihood 
 
-871.1 -669.6 -750.7 -199.1 -641.3 
Observations 400 400 400 400 400 
 
Robust p-values in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Specification of control variables as in Table 3, results omitted 
 
Table 8. Differentiated Tree Crops, Non-Kikuyu Households 
 
 Timber Fruit Coffee Tea Fodder 
Male Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Male-
headed HH 
 
2.153 0.306 9.454 5.896 -0.766 
(0.207) (0.575) (0.082)*** (0.644) (0.671) 
Female Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Male-
headed HH 
 
0.019 0.629 7.749 -5.083 4.408 
(0.988) (0.226) (0.038)** (0.793) (0.022)** 
Male Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Female-
headed HH 
 
5.004 0.773 12.389 -1.116 1.810 
(0.168) (0.424) (0.072)*** (0.961) (0.608) 
Female Heirs X Mortality 
risk of HH head, Female-
headed HH 
 
6.593 0.485 -6.811 41.198 -15.177 
(0.011)** (0.667) (0.608) (0.063)*** (0.064)*** 
Pseudo log-likelihood 
 
-1190.7 -873.4 -491.3 -374.5 -442.2 
Observations 503 503 503 503 503 
 
Robust p-values in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Specification of control variables as in Table 3, results omitted 
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Table 9. Zero/Single/Multiple Heirs Inheritance Anticipation Measure 
 
 Kikuyu non-Kikuyu 
Education of HH head 
 
0.061 0.299 
(0.677) (0.062)*** 
Children under 15 in HH 
 
0.092 0.160 
(0.780) (0.604) 
Total no. of adults in HH 
 
0.379 -0.597 
(0.189) (0.030)** 
HH used hired labor 
 
-1.317 0.173 
(0.443) (0.893) 
Other trees on plots owned by HH 
 
 
0.001 -0.001 
(0.284) (0.373) 
Log of years since acquisition 
 
2.382 2.420 
(0.001)* (0.000)* 
Market in village 
 
1.126 -3.351 
(0.426) (0.270) 
Plot size 
 
-0.765 -0.944 
(0.002)* (0.000)* 
Plot sloped 
 
2.865 2.753 
(0.013)** (0.100)*** 
Title deed 
 
5.176 1.508 
(0.007)* (0.317) 
Plot inherited 
 
 
4.848 2.162 
(0.003)* (0.080)*** 
Female-headed household dummy 
 
 
-3.476 -1.406 
(0.097)*** (0.640) 
Zero Male Heirs Dummy X Mortality Risk of 
HH Head, Male-headed HH 
1.870 -1.344 
(0.572) (0.822) 
Single Male Heir Dummy X Mortality Risk of 
HH Head, Male-headed HH 
-4.016 5.274 
(0.203) (0.121) 
Multiple Male Heirs Dummy X Mortality Risk 
of HH Head, Male-headed HH 
-9.411 6.748 
(0.134) (0.410) 
Zero Male Heirs Dummy X Mortality Risk of 
HH Head, Female-headed HH 
1.429 -3.612 
(0.833) (0.694) 
Single Male Heir Dummy X Mortality Risk of 
HH Head, Female-headed HH 
-0.546 9.938 
(0.924) (0.005)* 
Multiple Male Heirs Dummy X Mortality Risk 
of HH Head, Female-headed HH 
5.506 7.415 
(0.638) (0.570) 
Constant 
 
 
-3.722 0.388 
(0.331) (0.936) 
Pseudo log-likelihood -442.2 -1278.2 
Observations 400 503 
 
Robust p-values in parentheses 
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. Sequence of Period t Prior to Parent’s Death 
Period t begins 
Parent survives to t + 1 
h(t)  
Period t + 1 begins 
Parent dies 
1-h(t)  
Heirs make 
investment decisions 
Parent appropriates (1-α) of each 
Heir’s output, Heirs consume 
Inheritance: land is retained 
or reallocated according to 
bequest rule 
Heirs consume  
Heir retains plot Heir does not 
retain plot 
Heir realizes return to I, his 
own investment of T in 
period t-1 
Heir realizes return to I plus 
previous occupant’s 
investment in T in period t-1 
p+[(1-p)  / N] 1-p-[(1-p)  / N] 
Heirs make 
investment decisions 
Heirs make investment 
decisions 
Heir realizes return to I 
plus his investment in T in 
period t-1 
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Figure 2. Inheritance Concerns and Investment Decisions 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Kenyan Hazard Rates.   
 
